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I. Introduction
Was the original intent of the initiative really to help average citizens against railroad-sized
special interests, or is that a romanticized idea? Upon the backdrop of rampant corruption in all
levels of government, the people of California added the initiative, referendum, and recall as
protective measures. Colloquially, the initiative is described as a check upon abusive and corrupt
government that “the people” are able to swiftly utilize. Upon closer inspection, the initiative is
not an easily accessible arrow in the quiver of the people’s political power. Focusing on the
petition gathering requirements and the initiative-industrial-complex that has grown in modern
times, the initiative has become a tool for moneyed interests and out of reach for the average
citizen.
The requirement of obtaining over half a million valid signatures presents an issue that
may frustrate the purpose of the initiative. Filing fees, drafting and legal fees, focus groups and
polling, potential litigation regarding title and summary, field consultants, printing costs, paid
signature gathering, and potential opposition efforts amount to significant costs of qualifying
initiatives, to say nothing of the campaign expenses once an initiative is on the ballot. This
political environment, especially paid signature gathering industries, represent an expensive
barrier where labor unions, corporations, or ultra-wealthy single donors form and finance political
issue committees to support and oppose initiatives, potentially drowning out the political voice of
“the people” as envisioned by Governor Johnson and the Progressive movement.

II. History
The democratic principles of California’s current constitution reflect a long-held distrust of
elected legislative bodies. The modern birth of the electoral recall for instance, can be traced to
the Charter of Los Angeles in 1903. 1 The corruption and influence by the railroad industry over
California’s state and local government in the 19th century motivated financially equipped
activists to launch grand jury investigations against elected officials and corporate officers. 2
Among the prosecution team was a young lawyer named Hiram Johnson. 3 Nonpartisan
committees within California attempted to free the state from the railroad’s control, focusing on
local and state elections on non-railroad candidates. 4 Hiram Johnson was elected Governor in
1910 and has been called “the emissary of the cataclysm that smashed California’s longentrenched political corruption and brought into being the state’s unique political patterns of
today.” 5 The California Constitution was amended in 1911 in the surge of the progressive
movement that was sweeping the nation, adding the powers of the initiative, recall and referendum
processes to the people of California. 6
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At the same time, a constitutional convention was underway, and Governor Johnson took
the opportunity to lock out “political machines or special interests.” 7 On January 3 1911, in
Governor Johnson’s first inaugural address, he stated there is “one sovereign and master, the
people,” and asked the question how “best can we arm the people to protect themselves” against
individuals supported by “big business.” 8 The answer was given in the subsequent November
election, where the voters approved of Governor Johnson’s and the Progressive movement’s ideas
of the initiative, recall, and referendum. 9
The motivating force behind adding tools of direct democracy to California, the
Progressive Party, was a split from the Republican Party that inherited a level of organization and
finance that allowed for coordinated campaigns on even federal level elections. 10 Therefore, the
scenario of a concerned citizen gathering the requisite number of signatures for an initiative was
most likely never envisioned by Governor Johnson or other contemporary Progressives. Instead,
groups of citizens with financial support, like Progressive Party leader Theodore Roosevelt
waging war on the Republican Party with $2,500,000 in contributions from a few U.S. Steele
stockholders, was more likely the model envisioned for local progressive activists in California. 11
With the original intent of the initiative to give the people of California a political tool to
directly enact protective legislation, it is worth comparing the historic and modern initiative
requirements. The original requirements to place an initiative on the ballot called for 85,574
signatures for a constitutional amendment, and 53,484 signatures for a statutory initiative. 12 The
requirements as of February 2012 stand at 807,615 signatures for a constitutional amendment and
504,760 signatures for a statutory initiative. 13 In 1910 there were 725,000 eligible voters
compared to 23,551,699 in November 2010. 14 While the explosion in population may at first
present an issue of access to reach the required number of signatures, population densities have
increased as well, from just fewer than 6 persons per kilometer in 1910 to just over 93 persons per
kilometer in 2011. 15 Additionally, a successful statutory initiative required approximately 7% of
the voting population in 1910 and 2% of the voting population in 2010. These figures however
still do not ease the daunting task of collecting not only the statutorily necessary signatures, but
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also collecting the signatures above the requirement to ensure validity, especially since the eligible
voting population has increased at nearly twice the rate of population density growth. 16
III. Current Requirements and Statutes
The basis of authority for the initiative process was added to the California Constitution in
1911 as Article II, Section 8, which states, “The initiative is the power of the electors to propose
statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them.” 17 This section of the
Constitution also outlines the minimum signatures required to enact a statute (5% of the votes cast
from the last gubernatorial election) and an amendment to the constitution (8% of the votes cast
from the last gubernatorial election). 18 The section also mandates that initiatives be placed on the
ballot at least 131 days after it qualifies, embrace only one subject, be applied equally to all
political subdivisions of the state, and pass or fail in its entirety. 19
Language for initiatives is either written with the assistance of the Office of the Legislative
Counsel, or is written by private professional legal counsel. 20 If a proponent desires assistance of
the Office of the Legislative Counsel, the proponent must submit the idea in writing with 25 or
more elector signatures and have the Legislative Counsel determine that there is a “reasonable
probability that the measure will be submitted to the voters.” 21 Proposed language and a $200fee
are then submitted to the Attorney General, where a title for the petition and a summary of the
“purpose and points of the initiative” are prepared. 22 Any fiscal impact to the State is taken into
consideration and if a change to State finances is believed to occur, the California Department of
Finance, and the Joint Legislative Budget Committee will prepare an estimate to be included in the
initiative. 23
After meeting certain drafting requirements for the petition, proponents of an initiative
have up to 150 days to circulate the petition and collect the required number of signatures. 24 In
order to have the initiative be placed on the next ballot, it must qualify at least 131 days before the
date of the next election. 25 Signatures must then be delivered to the county in which the signatures
were collected to begin the verification process. 26 The elections officials then transmit the number
of signatures gathered to the Secretary of State so that the minimum number of signatures required
is confirmed. 27 Election officials in each county then take 500 signatures or random samples of
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3% of the total signatures gathered, whichever is greater, and verify the validity of the
signatures. 28
The number of valid signatures is then sent to the State where if the validity rates fall
below 95% of the total signatures gathered, the initiative shall be deemed to have failed to
qualify. 29 If the total number of valid signatures from the samples checked equal more than 110%
of the total signatures gathered, the initiative shall be deemed to have qualified. 30 If the valid
signatures represent a number between 95% and 110%, then each signature shall be checked to see
if the requisite number of signatures to pass has been collected. 31 Upon the event an initiative
passes the signature check, a copy of the initiative shall be given to the State Assembly and the
State Senate in order for public policy hearings to take place on the initiative as long as the
election is not within the next 30 days. 32 The legislature has no authority to alter the initiative –
the hearing is for informational purposes only. 33
IV. Paid Signature Campaigns
A. Proponent Costs
An inescapable fact of initiatives in California is that collecting over 500,000 signatures
requires a large amount of money. Initiatives that have qualified for the primary and general
elections of 2012 offer some insight into costs of California initiatives. There are two measures on
the June 5, 2012, primary ballot. 34 Proposition 28 adjusts term limits for California Legislators
and has three committees in support and none in opposition. 35 The “Californians for a Fresh Start”
committee, which made the most significant expenditures of all three supporting committees,
reports $409,655.50 in total expenditures for 2011 36, and $1,569,427.06 in total expenditures for
2010 37.
Expenditures were made for polling, campaign consulting, legal services, and information
and technology costs. However, a $1,624,087.73 expenditure to Kimball Petition Management,
Inc., for signature gathering represents the most significant cost for the Proposition 28 initiative
campaign. 38 The grand total of $1,979,082.56 from one committee for a proposition that makes a
28
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minor change to term limits, which is arguably not as controversial as other initiatives such as the
legalization of marijuana, sets the tone for the costs of initiatives in California.
There are several factors that typically impact the cost of initiative signature gathering.
Each signature gathered is a commodity in an actual nationwide signature gathering market, where
professional petition circulators travel across the country to gather signatures. 39 There are several
firms that operate on a national basis with the sole purpose of facilitating signature gathering for
initiative campaigns. 40 Some campaigns however, rely on volunteer signature gatherers, typically
conducted by labor unions with membership volunteering their time to circulate petitions. 41
Volunteer based campaigns still require large amounts of funding for logistical needs and
professional staff to train volunteers. 42 When a committee is at the stage to collect signatures, that
committee may contract with a signature-gathering firm to manage independent area coordinators
that hire professional signature gatherers based on geographic and temporal constraints. 43
Petition-management firms, like Kimball Petition Management Inc. in the above example of
Proposition 28, operate with few full-time employees, and contract fieldwork out to independent
contractors who manage crew chiefs that coordinate the professional signature gatherers that
specialize in specific locations. 44
The amount of signatures required, combined with the statutory time restraints to have the
initiative be on the next available election sets the level of urgency, which raises and lowers the
price per signature. 45 Signature gathering campaigns are mostly field-oriented with the majority
of expenses going towards petition circulator wages or commissions. 46 The labor of professional
signature gatherers is also subject to supply and demand, since signature-gathering firms compete
with other initiative efforts to attract signature gatherers across the country with high wages or
commissions. 47 Kimball Petition Management Inc., reports signature price rates as low as forty
cents per signature, and as high as five dollars per signature. 48 This last point may provide an
interesting tactical advantage for opposition campaigns by creating additional costs for proponents
through counter initiatives.
B. Opponent-Created Costs
Opponents of initiatives have few options to challenge the proponents of an issue
campaign during the signature gathering process. Opponents may either wait to see if proponents
are not able to gather the required amount of signatures in hopes that a long ballot measure
campaign is avoided, or opponents may manipulate the signature market to drive up costs. One
39
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method to drive up signature costs for proponents of an initiative is to introduce counter-initiatives
to the signature-gathering market. 49 Counter-initiatives are designed to force proponents of one
initiative to split their resources to fight off a second initiative. 50 Not only will proponents need to
spend money on viability of the counter-initiative (polling, focus groups, legal opinions, etc.), but
the counter-initiative could be set with a high price-per-signature, leading signature gatherers away
from the original initiative unless the price for the original initiative is raised as well. 51 Other
considerations such as language in the counter-initiative that effectively undermines and trumps
the original initiative or will force the proponents to spend more money on future ballot measure
campaigns, thus creating incentives for a higher price-per-signature. 52
The second method for raising the costs of initiatives is conducting anti-qualification, or
field opposition campaigns. 53 Field opposition campaigns utilize grassroots networks to identify
signature gatherers in the field and dispatch activists to dissuade potential signatories from singing
the petition. 54 In some instances, this method can be effective in preventing a campaign from
obtaining the required number of signatures. For instance, “Hands of Washington” a coalition of
gay rights activists sent “Bigot Busters” to locations where petition gatherers were collecting
signatures for an anti-gay rights initiative, and prevented the initiative from qualifying. 55 Unless
field opposition campaigns are started early on in the process however, well-financed proponents
will most likely be able to meet the required number of signatures. 56
A November 2012 ballot measure in California is an example of a massive field opposition
campaign. A yet-unnumbered ballot measure (as of February 2012) titled as “Prohibits political
contributions by payroll deductions. Prohibitions on contributions to candidates. Initiative Statute”
lists three committees in support and one in opposition. 57 The initiative is facing major opposition
by the “Alliance for a Better California 2012, No on Paycheck Deception, Sponsored by
Educators, Firefighters, School Employees, Health Care Givers, and Labor Organizations” a
coalition of labor groups that collected over $800,000 in 2011. 58 The alliance spent $369,752.89
in 2011, mostly on research and legal services. 59
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Terra Strategies, working with the California State Council of the Service Employee
International Union (“SEIU”), conducted the field opposition campaign. 60 The California State
Council of SEIU expenditure reports for 2011 show $1,397,992 in total to Terra Strategies. 61
While Terra Strategies implemented the field opposition campaign to dispatch activists to provide
counter-narratives and dissuade voters from signing the initiative, the proponents were able to
obtain enough signatures to qualify for the November 2012 ballot. 62 In order to qualify however,
“Californians Against Special Interests” spent $935,886.50 63 and the “Citizen Power Campaign”
spent $235,000 64 for a total of $1,170,886.50 to the petition management firm, Bader &
Associates, Inc.
Field opposition campaigns can drastically increase the costs of initiatives; however, they
may not prevent an initiative from qualifying altogether. Industry experts suggest a more effective
strategy is to focus on counter-initiatives, possibly in other states, to consume the supply of
professional signature gatherers. 65 Counter-initiatives that pay a premium fee will also give
professional signature gatherers an incentive to focus their attention on the high-paying petitions
and less on others. 66 Regardless of the fact that the initiative qualified, proponents raised their
signature price, spent more time in the field, and paid a higher cost of trying to pass initiatives in
California. 67
V. Judicial Cases On Paid Petition Gathering
Perhaps the most influential case on paid petition gathering is the 1988 Supreme Court
decision of Meyer v. Grant. That case arose after the state of Colorado made the act of paying a
petition circulator a felony. 68 The District Court held that the restriction on paid signature
gatherers was not a restriction of proponents’ speech, and for the sake of argument, the burden of
not allowing paid petition circulators ensured a broad base of volunteer support to warrant
placement on the ballot and to protect the integrity of the political process. 69 The Tenth Circuit, en
banc, reversed. 70 The Supreme Court agreed with the reversal of the District Court, relying on
First Amendment protections of political expenditures as defined by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1
60
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(1976). 71 In Buckley, the Supreme Court held that speech as protected by the First Amendment in
the form of political expression, including a political expenditure, is subject to “exacting
scrutiny.” 72
In scrutinizing the limitation on paid petition circulators in Meyers, the Supreme Court
found that circulators persuade voters to believe that an issue is worth consideration by the
electorate, making this type of communication “core political speech.” 73 By refusing to allow
proponents of an initiative the ability to pay circulators, the Supreme Court found that Colorado
was limiting the size of the audience that proponents could reach and limiting their ability to place
the issue on the ballot. 74 The state’s argument that the burden on the proponent’s First
Amendment right is acceptable because other avenues of expression existed was not persuasive to
the Court. 75 The Court identified initiative proponent’s right to select a method of paying petition
circulators by stating, “The First Amendment protects appellees’ right not only to advocate their
cause but also to select what they believe to be the most effective means for so doing.” 76
Solidifying the expansion of Buckley to paid signature gathering, the Court stated that the principle
of Buckley “applies equally to the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the
passage or defeat of legislation.” 77 This landmark decision effectively established protection for
the professionally-paid initiative signature gathering industry as political speech, spurring the
multi-million dollar industry.
Another far-reaching Supreme Court case regarding paid signature gathering efforts is
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation 78. In this case, the Supreme Court heard
several issues concerning paid signature gatherers. First, Colorado required circulators to be
registered to vote. 79 In line with the Court’s decision in Meyers, requiring paid petition circulators
to be registered to vote and hold residence in state had the effect of restricting the supply of
circulators, which restricted the proponents’ political speech. 80 The State claimed the requirements
aided in policing lawbreakers amongst circulators. However, circulators already signed affidavits
authenticating their residency, thus ensuring State subpoena power, and the impact of forced voter
registration on the supply of circulators did not justify the burden on political expression. 81
The second issue discussed in Buckley dealt with Colorado’s requirement that paid
circulators wear identification badges so that the names of circulators could be known to help fight
petition fraud. 82 The Court reaffirmed that the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech
protects anonymous political speech. 83 Again, the affidavits that circulators sign sufficiently
identify the circulators to help prevent or prosecute fraud, and evidence from the District Court
71
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showed that wearing name badges discouraged participation in the petition circulation process. 84
The Court also stated that the need for anonymity is at its greatest at the time of persuading a voter
to sign a petition. 85 Colorado lacked sufficient cause to burden the proponents’ Constitutional
rights. 86
Finally, the Supreme Court also reviewed Colorado’s requirement that paid circulators
report their name, address and total amount paid in a monthly disclosure. 87 The Supreme Court
recognized the valid State interest of disclosure of contributors to political campaigns, so that
electors could evaluate “those who seek their vote.” 88 While respecting the State interest of
political disclosures, the Court found that targeting paid circulators and leaving volunteer
circulators unaffected failed exacting scrutiny89, and leaving the reports showing contributor
activity protected the check against “domination of the initiative process by affluent special
interest groups.” 90 Colorado had not proved that the three regulations furthered any substantial
State interest under exacting scrutiny that outweighed the burden the State imposed on political
speech, which is why the Court rejected the restraints placed on the initiative process.
In 2006, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a limit banning the practice of petition
management firms paying on a fee-per-signature basis in Oregon. In Prete v. Bradbury 91, the
Court of Appeals reviewed the effect that Measure 26, an Oregon constitutional amendment that
banned the practice of paying petition circulators for each signature gathered. 92 The appellate
court followed the principles provided by the Meyers and Buckley decisions by reaffirming
petition gathering as “core political speech” and that states have “leeway to protect the integrity
and reliability of the initiative process.” 93 In Meyers, the court recognized the right to pay petition
circulators, as it was political speech protected by the First Amendment. 94 The issue in Prete,
however, was not whether to allow paid petition circulators, but rather how petition circulators
would be paid. 95
In Meyers, the prohibition on paid petition circulators was a significant or severe burden
while in Prete the Court found Plaintiffs did not prove a severe burden since paid petition
circulators could be paid in other methods. Additionally, the Court stated that a lesser burden was
“reasonably related and justified by the state’s interest in preventing fraud in the initiative
process.” 96 The Plaintiffs were not able to prove any effect on the supply of paid petition
circulators in Oregon, nor could the Plaintiffs prove an effect on the cost of signatures or any
adverse effects on signature validity rates if petition circulators were paid in a non fee-per84
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signature payroll scheme. 97 On the other hand, the defense was able, under a burden of the “lesser
variety,” rather than the exacting scrutiny of Meyers, to show an “important regulatory interest in
preventing fraud and forgery,” and the Court affirmed the ruling, holding the constitutional
amendment banning fee-per-signature payment methods as not contrary to the First Amendment. 98
VI. Conclusion
The tools of direct democracy were added to the California constitution in an era following
massive corporate corruption of the state and local government. The Progressive movement
sought out a revised government where the people would be able to utilize the recall, referendum,
and initiative, to circumvent a corrupt or neglectful Legislature. However, even at the time of the
Progressive Revolution, it was a large burden for a small or volunteer-based political committee to
gather the necessary signatures to use the initiative process.
The initiative process in California is a long, expensive, and extensive process that may be
just as difficult, if not more, than traditional legislating. The requirements of initiatives, combined
with the amount of political expenditures on signature gathering campaigns (both in support and
opposition), and the judicial balance between protecting political speech and state’s police powers
make any initiative undertaking incredibly difficult. This daunting labyrinth says nothing about
the larger political environment and post-qualification campaign that surrounds the initiative
process.
That environment suggests that proponents ideally will acquire proper advice on initiative
language, both legally and through polling or focus groups, and be prepared for legal issues
surrounding title and summary of the initiative to ensure the time and money invested into the
signature gathering is worthwhile. Furthermore, proponents usually will face an intense ballot
measure campaign after collecting signatures to have the measure pass into law. This only
exacerbates the costs and challenges for “the people” to utilize the initiative process. Although,
taking into perspective the level of organization the Progressive Party had when adding these tools
of direct democracy, perhaps it is fair to say that the difficulties in the initiative process serve as a
check against rampant tyranny of small political minorities legislating above “the people’s”
elected representatives.
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